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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

NATO INFLUENCE ON ROMANIAN NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE POST COLD WAR ERA

by

Silviu Daniel Popa

June 2002

Thesis Advisor:
Second Reader:

Jeff Knopf
Frank Barrett

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**NATO INFLUENCE ON ROMANIAN NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE POST
COLD WAR ERA**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT

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ABSTRACT

The transformation of the political relations in Europe at the dawn of the 21st century resulted in deep changes in the concepts of security and collective defense.

In the context of NATO becoming an organization dedicated to freedom and democratic values, Romania reconsidered its political and strategic position, started profound reforms in its security institutions and continues to consolidate the democratic statecraft.

This thesis examines the influence of NATO mechanisms on Romanian National Security in the Post Cold War Era. The analysis is primarily concerned with examining the building blocks and mechanisms by which NATO extends its institutional and normative influence and contributes or not to reducing chances for military conflict and political tension in the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) countries, by integrating them into the Western security community and increasing the speed of democratic domestic reforms.

The analysis concludes that through NATO influence, Romania has developed into a major factor of peace and stability in the area and could become an important military contributor to NATO.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

BSEC	Black Sea Economic Cooperation
CEE	Central Eastern Europe
CEI	Central European Initiative
CJTF	Combined Joint Task Force
CSCE	Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe
DCI	Defense Capabilities Initiative
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
EU	European Union
HLSG	High level Steering Group
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IFOR	Implementation Force
IO	Interoperability Objectives
IPP	Individual Partnership Program
MAP	Membership Action Plan
MC	Military Committee
MIR	MNC Interoperability Requirement
MNC	Major NATO Command
MTI	MNC Tasks for Interoperability
MOND	Ministry of National defense of Romania
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OCC	Operational Capabilities Concept
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PARP	Planning and Review Process
PC	Political Committee
PCC	Partnership Coordination Cell
PfP	Partnership for Peace
PMSC	Political-Military Steering Committee
PG	Partnership Goals
PSE	PfP Staff Element
PWP	Partnership Work Program
RAF	Romanian Armed Forces
RCE	Regional Cooperation Enhancement
SEECF	South-East European Cooperation Process
SECI	South-East European Cooperation Initiative
SFOR	Stabilization Force
WEU	Western European Union
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to express my entire admiration for the American society, and for all the things that have been made possible during my course of study. I showed my feelings of love for American values and people in the speech that I gave on International Memorial Day for the victims of September 11, 2001:¹

Ladies and gentlemen, children, dear American friends,

It is a hard moment for everyone to remember the shocking events that shattered our lives, one week ago. No words can possibly describe the enormous drama lived by the American people in the tragic events.

Tuesday, 11 September, we got a glimpse of what the world could be without America, and I can honestly tell you that we did not like such a perspective. The US is not something external to us. We care for its symbols and WTC and the Pentagon are very important ones. But most of all we care for those people who were killed in these unbelievable events and their loving families who suffer so much. On behalf of my colleagues, I wish to express our great compassion for every person who was so badly affected by this tragedy.

We have all, with no discrimination among nationality, lost something. At least our innocence and our naivety are gone for a while. The hope for a better world was questionable.

After the Cold War, the US represented the major source of inspiration for the newborn democracies from the Eastern part of Europe. The American material and spiritual help was extremely important, and the light of freedom was shining from the American souls.

Today, we are here to show you that your work is useful and we share your faith in democracy, freedom, responsibility, and tolerance. United by these values, we support you in the dangerous fight against the forces of darkness.

As a personal point of view, two months ago I spent 10 days in New York and every day, with my family, we went to visit Manhattan. The Americans symbols were there and we saw them. Today, when dust covers WTC we all have the honorable duties to keep this symbol in our heart and tell everyone about their vision of liberty and prosperity.

Most of my last six years, I had the chance to work with American friends and every day I have discovered the power of the American spirit. Today, there is a lot of pain and desire of revenge in every American soul but I am sure that this situation will be overcome and the American ideals will win. God bless America and all of us.

¹ The International Memorial Day for the victims of September 11,2001 was held on September 25,2001

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

At the beginning of the 21st century Europe's political and economic order is by no means settled. It is rapidly shifting and Europe is changing in a new political environment. The Cold War is over, the major threats and fears of global war's cataclysms are gone, bringing deep and dramatic changes from the bipolar model of relationship between the superpowers and rearranging the security relations and the existing status quo.

The East-West confrontation and the dividing line in the core of Europe disappeared. At the same time, European security institutions underwent significant changes, the Warsaw pact was dissolved but NATO unquestionably remained the security defense framework of Western Europe.

This research is motivated by the current debate on NATO Enlargement which I think is concentrated mostly on two trends, both of them probably missing some key elements of the process. First, a major concern is the impact of the new members on the Alliance (institutionally, politically, financially, and militarily). Second, the capacity of those selected to cope with NATO's requirements is also a concern. In both cases the analysis is static. For a better understanding of the benefits and losses of such a process, a chronological view of the NATO influence on a state is helpful. In the case of Romanian public opinion and literature on NATO membership, the process is treated obsessively at all the levels and politician's concentration is on the momentum, emotions, and electoral gain rather than on long term project and objective calculations.

B. OBJECTIVES

By looking at the Romanian case, I will try to see if the institutional and normative adjustments induced by NATO's cooperative security arrangements are associated with regionally cooperative attitudes and democratic development of the political-military structures.

C. THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The thesis discusses the following questions:

- What are the alternatives to assure national security for Romania?
- Why and how much is Romania interested in NATO membership?
- What are the Romanian's arguments for NATO membership?
- What are NATO's mechanisms of influence?
- What is the NATO impact on Romanian-Hungarian relations?
- What is NATO's influence on the restructuring process of the Romanian Armed Forces?

D. METHODOLOGY

There are many factors that have an impact on Romanian National Security, NATO being one of them. As a result, the thesis does not seek comprehensive causal explanation. The research tries to describe institutions and events in coherent ways that make sense of the actions we observe. In my analysis I try to understand the effects of NATO mechanisms on Romanian policies and organizations.

E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY

Logically, the international institution's ability to influence domestic policies and organizations is closely connected with the respective state desire to obtain its membership. Without a strong will behind the main internal actors to join the international institution, the influence that the external factor can exercise is hugely diminished. Consequently, I will start my thesis with an analysis of the rationale behind Romania's desire for NATO membership.

An analysis of the main mechanisms through which NATO can exercise influence on outside actors follows. Chapter three is a chronological description of the development of NATO's main instruments for dealing with new aspirant countries: North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the New Strategic Concept, and Membership Action Plan. Through these structures, organizations,

and programs, NATO exercises its main influence on domestic actors responsible for national security elaboration and implementation.

Chapter four presents the impact of NATO on Romanian - Hungarian relations in the last decade. The reason behind the selection of this case is given by the pattern of historical enmity between Romania and Hungary. Romania has the largest Hungarian minority in the region and minority tensions were in the headlines in the beginning of 1990s and even today are a delicate subject in the Balkans and area around. Any success in improving the relations between these two states increases the significance of external factors in stabilizing and harmonious development of the region. Chapter five looks at major military reforms in the Romanian Armed Forces as a result of NATO's requirements. In spite of all the discussions about NATO as a political organization, the main focus of the Alliance was and will remain a military one. The defense area is a primary concern for NATO and Romania's reaction in shaping its military policies and forces provides a good case for analysis.

In the conclusion, I evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of NATO in influencing positive trends in Romania.

NATO and specifically the Membership Action Plan framework has helped Romania deliver reforms in both the civic and military context that otherwise would not have been possible. NATO's programs, structures, and people have guided important aspects of the Romania's transition to a democratic society.

The thesis tries to find out NATO's ability to successfully plant the institutional and normative seeds necessary for the incorporation of Romania into the Western community by encouraging good relations with neighbor countries and development of modern Armed Forces.

NATO and Romania have a tough way to go and the final results will depend on both sides, but the lesson of history has proven that the Alliance is able to bring prosperity for its citizen and defend values such freedom and individual rights. After four decades of communism and with political leadership unable to find a viable solution for the transition process, the Romanian population anchors their hopes in NATO's capability to manage difficult situations, create stability, sustain peace, and increase social welfare.

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II. ROMANIA'S ARGUMENTS FOR NATO MEMBERSHIP

For more than four decades the world was divided into the Eastern and Western Blocs. Each side was not only politically aligned but was also militarily protected by its own security organization, the Warsaw Pact and NATO, respectively. At the end of the 20th century the Cold War was over bringing deep and dramatic changes into the bipolar model of international relations. In eastern and central Europe, former members of the Warsaw Pact and newly emerging countries were left in a security vacuum.

Facing tensions and instabilities from the hard process of democratization and introduction of free market reform in the economic sector, Romania has tried to find ways to diminish its security risks in the new unstable environment.

After more than 50 years of success in providing security to its members, and persisting after the major reason for its creation disappeared with the collapse of Soviet Empire, NATO is the most attractive solution.

The purpose of this chapter is to find an answer for the following question: Why and how much is Romania interested in NATO membership?

Even though we share the idea of NATO being a key element on the European security stage, we need to investigate other potential security options for Romania. Are there any other alternatives to NATO that Romania might prefer?

In order to analyze the Romanian security environment and find alternatives for NATO membership in the Post Cold War Era, we need to make three assumptions. The first assumption is that after NATO's first round of enlargement there is a disparity of security in central and eastern Europe.

The second assumption, in contradiction with the idea of an indivisible Europe, is that European countries outside NATO and EU, even though they are considered members of the European family, do not feel included in the European architecture of security.

The final one is that, in spite of Kantian-Wilsonian solutions (OSCE, European Council etc.), the European security system is a Westphalian one, which needs a balance of power in order to function properly. In this arrangement states situated in the gray area between NATO and Russia are weak because of their recent statality and slow economic

and political reforms after the fall of communism. Consequently, their individual role in the balance of power is not significant.

A. ALTERNATIVES TO NATO MEMBERSHIP

1. EU Integration

Romania has traditional ties with the European Union. It was the only Eastern European country, which as early as the '70s developed a well-defined juridical framework in its relations with the European Community. The goal of attaining the EU membership, in a short time period, constitutes an absolute priority for Romania's policy.

Romania's major objectives for seeking to join the Community structures take into account:

- the consolidation of the political system and of the democratic institutions;
- the creation of an economic and social climate that would offer a maximum of satisfaction and benefits to its citizens;
- the improving of the efficiency of market economy structures and mechanisms;
- the strengthening of political, economic and social cooperation with the European Union member states and the candidate countries; and
- the consolidation of Romania's statute on the European and international scene, in terms of stability and security.²

Romania is on the way to satisfying the political criteria completely, and has made significant progress in the establishment of a viable market economy, even though this requires an ongoing substantial effort. Major difficulties are also encountered in the installation of a true competition climate; at the same time, the essential elements of the “*acquis communautaire*” have not been undertaken, especially in the domain of the Internal Market.

In spite of the development of European Security and Defense Policy with its headline goal that by 2003 the EU should be able to deploy 50,000 to 60,000 persons for a sustained operation of one year or more, EU membership does not offer the same level

² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania: <http://domino.kappa.ro/mae/dosare.nsf/Integrare>

of security as that enjoyed by NATO members. An aggression against an EU state does not produce a reaction from the Union as a whole. As yet, the EU does not have any military forces of its own, and there is no mutual defense obligation codified by treaty.

Also, Romania has been ruled out of any possible adherence plan to the EU in the first wave of 2004. The most optimistic prediction is that Romania will join the EU in 2007. That is, EU membership is viewed as a complementary process to NATO integration.

2. Strategic Partnership

A specific approach in overcoming security discrepancies in central and eastern countries is a bilateral relationship with a strategic partner. The main characteristic of the relation is the power asymmetry between them. Generally, the strong partner is a great power, an influential international actor, which can offer a certain range of security to its weak partner. Taking into consideration this feature, strategic partnership is a new kind of bandwagoning. Romania has tried to establish some strategic partnerships with the US, France, and Italy.

The Romania-US Strategic Partnership is the most important and it represents a coordination framework agreed upon by both countries in order to achieve certain major common goals, marking up the maturity level of their bilateral relationship in accordance with the special role mutually granted by each country within their foreign policy priorities.

The Concept of the Strategic Partnership was launched in 1997, during the visit in Romania of Mr. William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States.

The main objectives of this partnership coordination framework are: developing bilateral economic and political cooperation; supporting Romanian efforts towards the NATO and EU accession; increasing the Romanian contribution to the Central and South-Eastern Europe security; strengthening Romanian democracy; and gaining American support in order to speed up the economic reform process in Romania.

The intensified stage of the Strategic Partnership was launched during the visit to Bucharest of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering (February 2000). The "Intensified Strategic Partnership Framework" sets forth priorities

and objectives of the strategic fields belonging to the bilateral cooperation: economy, military, regional stability and non-traditional threats.

The main features of the intensified stage of the Strategic Partnership are:

- A focus on the economic dimension and the identification and implementation of concrete projects of common interest;
- Pragmatism in defining and carrying out the commonly agreed objectives, particularly those ones with regional resonance.

Strategic Partnership carries some advantages in the economic and political domains of security, but it does not offer any guarantees in the event of either conflict problems or aggression.

3. Regional Cooperation

Romania has developed two forms of regional cooperation: trilateral cooperation and sub-regional cooperation.

Trilateral cooperation represents a flexible form of sub-regional cooperation, which develops according to the principles and in the fields commonly agreed by the participating states. The objectives, fields of cooperation, mechanisms, legal framework and degree of institutionalization differ, depending on the interests and practices of member states.

Since the sub-regional cooperation is regarded as an indispensable component of the European and Euro-Atlantic integration process, and not as an alternative to it, the trilateral cooperation has favorable effects for Romania, within the process of integration in NATO, and for its affirmation as a stability factor in the region.

The specific objectives of these forms of cooperation belong to the political, economic and social fields, and make it possible to realize the advantages resulting from the geographic proximity, the complementarity of the national economies, and some cooperative traditions.

Romania participates in the following initiatives of trilateral cooperation:

- Romania – Bulgaria - Greece
- Romania – Bulgaria - Turkey
- Romania – Hungary - Austria

- Romania – Poland - Ukraine
- Romania - Republic of Moldova – Ukraine

Sub-regional cooperation has as a basis a wide area of preoccupations, essentially linked with the security and stability of the South-East European region, its economic development on the whole, and the formation of a new philosophy of multidimensional cooperation in the spirit of a new identity oriented toward the common values of democracy and market economy, which characterize the European and Euro-Atlantic societies.

The sub-regional cooperation initiatives in which Romania participates are the following:

- South-East European Cooperation Process (SEECF)
- South-East European Cooperation Initiative (SECI)
- Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC)
- Priorities of Romania's Chairmanship-in-Office of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC)
- Central European Initiative (CEI)³

The main function of these initiatives, beyond cooperation and creating a good neighborhood, is to create a path towards better-structured, more powerful and efficient organizations, especially regarding security. They have a temporary character and their role is to carry Romania to the target institution. As in the Visegrad case⁴, after Romania will join NATO and EU, some of these initiatives will disappear.

4. Neutrality

Romania's security status is that of de facto neutrality, imposed by external circumstances. Romania evolved in the field of national security from a formal status of ally in the Warsaw Treaty Organization to that of candidate for NATO accession. A

³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania: <http://domino.kappa.ro/mae/politica.nsf/Teme>

⁴ Visegrad states: The Czech Republic, Slovakia (together Czechoslovakia until 1993), Hungary and Poland, formerly satellites of the Soviet Union and members of the Warsaw Pact, which met at Visegrad in 1991 and agreed to cooperate in seeking membership of NATO and the EU as a route to total integration into Western Europe. All four countries are members of the Council of Europe and have Association Agreements.

second, deeper level of analysis indicates an evolution from isolation and quasi-autarky towards quasi-neutrality.

Romania's military doctrine, still an informal document, does not identify any enemy explicitly. Instead, the law of national security calls for protection *touts azimuths* - the enemy could be everywhere (even if none is explicitly identified). Consequently as a neutral state, Romania protects itself against external threats that could emerge from any direction.

The military neutrality of the region that separated NATO from the ex-USSR on the model of Finland and Austria during the Cold War, was the first solution considered in the West before the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO).

This kind of security status creates political consequences/constraints for the states that adopt it. Among them the most important would be:

- the state in case is not hostile to either part in conflict;
- it refrains from openly criticizing them;
- it develops a strictly defensive posture, with a low military potential; and
- it can afford the defense expenditures for its own security.

Besides, the great powers' agreement is necessary. Otherwise one can end up in a situation of legal neutrality which is not respected in practice. Romania's history provides a very good counterargument for neutrality. Same as at the beginning of the 1'st World War, Romania declared neutrality in 1939 when the 2'nd World War began. But the country was mutilated by the secret Ribbentrop-Molotov pact against Romania (taking away Bassarabia, Bukovina and Hertza land), with Bulgaria taking over Southern Dobrogea, and part of Transylvania being ceded to Hungary as an award following the Vienna dictate. A military government was formed and General Ion Antonescu was the head of it. In a desperate try to get back the lost provinces, he joined the Axis in the war against Russia (Soviet Union).

5. Alliance with Russia

This alternative, as strange as it may sound, was mentioned several times during the Bosnia and Kosovo conflicts. The creation of an alliance consisting of Russia, Ukraine and Yugoslavia appeared in some newspapers but was immediately rejected by the Romanian officials.

In the Romanian political perception after 1989, Russia's image remained that of a power so overwhelmingly great and uncontrollable for a country with the size and force of Romania that the best reaction one could have is the policy of the ostrich: head in the sand. The historical tradition, the repeated invasions, the humiliating wresting of Bessarabia and North Bucovina in 1940, the bringing in of communism, all this mingled to define a relation of Romania to Russia driven by a more or less irrational fear, by clichés, by inhibitions and complexes. As Romania perceives itself more and more as a European political actor does, a change of attitude towards Russia is likely to follow. It would be a first signal for Romania to defeat the complex of the small actor and overcome problems in issues of external political identity. But from here to an alliance with Russia is too big a step and for most of the Romanians is impossible to imagine.

B. NATO MEMBERSHIP

Even though some of the alternatives, such as EU integration, strategic partnership, and regional cooperation are not excluded by NATO membership having them as a matter of choice, we can now try to find an answer to the question: Why is Romania interested in NATO membership?

Geographically, Romania lays in Central Europe, equidistant between the Atlantic and Urals Mountains. Its Latin language and cultural heritage-connected to the Mediterranean civilization, with ancient Greece and Rome-are part of Europe. The Romanian political and intellectual elite, educated in the 19th and 20th centuries in Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and Rome, always defined their identity with reference to the values, ideas, and developments of Western Europe. The adoption of the first modern Romanian constitution in 1923 provided for a multi-party political system, separation of powers, and universal vote. The Romanian cultural avant-garde artists studied and performed in Western Europe and United States. They were inspired by the Western culture and contributed to it as well.

During the second half of the twentieth century, the Soviet occupation cruelly diverted Romania from its natural evolution. There were moments during the Soviet domination when ideals, associated with fundamental freedoms and Western identity, influenced most of the citizens. In the late 1950's and 1960's, Romania was the first country in the Soviet bloc to develop economic, technological and cultural relations with

Western countries and to establish diplomatic relations with Western Germany. In 1968, Romania was the only Warsaw Pact member that refused to take part in invasion of Czechoslovakia and condemned the Soviet-led crushing of the Prague Spring.

At the grassroots level, ordinary Romanians, especially the younger generation, had a great appetite for freedom, nourished by the symbols of the Western culture: Western music, movies and also by Radio Free Europe and Voice of America. It is not by chance that it was the young generation who took to the streets in December 1989 and shed their blood for the triumph of freedom, generating dramatic changes in Romania.

The communist regime in Romania fell in December 1989. This opened the path for Romania's return to the community of democratic nations. Immediately, the country readopted traditional state symbols to link them with the national heritage - the flag, the coat-of-arms and a national anthem generated by the democratic changes in the 19th century. A new Constitution, enacted in 1991, became the backbone of a society based on a pluralist political system, fundamental freedoms, respect for minorities, and division of power among legislative, executive and judicial branches.

In economic terms, 75% of our trade is with the European Union and the United States. Hundreds of Romanian students study abroad, most of them in the United States.

Romania wants to project its Western identity not only internally, but also as an active participant in the international politics. The desire to join NATO does not come merely from a wish to enjoy the security umbrella of the alliance. The Romanian people want not only to share the values of Western community, but also to defend these values, shoulder to shoulder with NATO allies. Four years after Romania missed out on NATO's first eastward enlargement, Romanians remain overwhelmingly in favor of joining the alliance. In March 2001, as much as 85 percent of the population wants Romania in NATO⁵ -- a level of support greater than in any other Eastern candidate country, a statistic that the most likely candidates for entry, the Baltic states and Slovenia, can only dream of.

Romania became active in international peacekeeping missions in 1991, when it participated in the Gulf War, after endorsing, as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, the UN decision to fight the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. Also, it participated in

⁵ Radio Free Europe: Eugen Tomiuc, *"Romania: Analysts Question Chances For NATO Membership"*. <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/03/16032001112437.asp>

peacekeeping missions in Somalia, Angola, Albania, Bosnia and Kosovo. Table 1 provides detailed information about Romanian military contribution to such missions from 1990 to 2002.

Country	Mission	Period	Forces
Angola	UNAVEM III	1995 - 1998	980
Albania	<i>ALBA</i>	1997	400
Bosnia	<i>IFOR</i>	1996	200
Bosnia	<i>SFOR</i>	1996-2002	550
Bosnia	<i>SFOR</i>	1996-2002	820
Kosovo	<i>KVM</i>	1999-2002	1
Kosovo	<i>UNMIK</i>	1999-2002	1
Kosovo	<i>KFOR</i>	2000-2002	105
Ethiopia - Eritreea	<i>UNMEE</i>	1990-2002	8
Georgia	-	1999-2002	2
Iraq - Kuwait	<i>UNIKOM</i>	1991-2002	5
Congo	<i>MONUC</i>	1999-2002	19

Table 1: *Romania's Participation in NATO/UN Operations*⁶

Today, Romania is a functioning pluralistic democracy with the main instruments of a market economy already in place and a substantial growth potential. The Romanian Government is committed to a radical economic reform program which seeks to give a new impetus to economic growth, to fight against poverty and unemployment, to rebuild the state institution's authority, to reduce the bureaucracy, to enhance the fight against corruption and criminality, and to continue and speed up the process of integration into the EU and NATO.

The progress achieved so far in consolidating the democracy and the state of law emphasizes that Romania has assimilated and promotes the democratic principles and the values shared by all NATO member states. The irreversibility of this trend will be confirmed through Romania's integration into NATO.

⁶ The Romanian Ministry of National Defense: <http://www.mapn.ro/>

The democratic transfer of authority following the legislative and presidential elections which took place in 1996 and 2000 represents another proof of the maturity of the political establishment and for the public level of participation in the democratic process.

III. NATO MAIN MECHANISMS OF INFLUENCE

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and of its CEE communist satellites, NATO defied all realist assumptions about alliances dissolving in the absence of a threat. It made instead a series of steps that allowed it to remain more significant than the OSCE and WEU and move again, within just a decade, to the core of the European security system. Through a series of processes and transformations, NATO has succeeded in remaining a stable and important security organization. After taking a vacillating start at the beginning of the 90s, NATO has been gradually accelerating the tempo by launching the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994, opening the door to the first three CEE members in 1997, initiating its first out-of-area missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, and preparing itself for a next round of enlargement in 2002.⁷

In order to observe NATO's influence on domestic actors responsible for national security elaboration and implementation, a chronological description of the development of NATO's main instruments for dealing with new aspirant countries - North Atlantic Cooperation Council, Partnership for Peace, Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the New Strategic Concept, and Membership Action Plan - is necessary. Once a country is connected with this multitude of structures, organizations and programs, there is not much room left for other alternatives than to conform to the system that NATO has created.

A. THE NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL

NATO reacted to the events of 1989 by extending a hand of friendship to six former Warsaw Pact members – Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and the Soviet Union – at the London Summit in July 1990. NATO invited these countries to visit Brussels and address the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The Alliance further extended an invitation to these governments to establish regular diplomatic liaison and intensify military contacts with NATO. In the words of NATO's London Declaration:

We need to keep standing together, to extend the long peace we have enjoyed these past four decades. Yet our alliance must be even more an

⁷ Corneliu Bjola, *NATO as a Factor of Security Building: Enlargement and Democratization in Central and Eastern Europe*, p.15

agent of change. It can help build the structures of a more united continent, supporting security and stability with the strength of our shared faith in democracy, the rights of the individual, and the peaceful resolution of disputes.⁸

A year later at the Rome summit in November 1991, NATO took a further step by adopting a new Strategic Concept and establishing a more direct relationship with the CEE countries through the newly created North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). In their November 1991 November Strategic Concept, the Allies recalled the Alliance's two classic purposes, as follows: "safeguarding the security and territorial integrity of its members, and establishing a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe."⁹ Also, the document acknowledged that:

Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social, and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe.¹⁰

As a result, Allied security policy would henceforth be based on "three mutually reinforcing elements . . . dialogue, cooperation, and the maintenance of a collective defense capability. The dual approach of dialogue and defense was expanded into a triad of cooperation, dialogue, and defense."¹¹

The NACC was designed to go beyond military contacts and regular diplomatic liaison and to provide a formal mechanism through which CEE countries could consult with NATO on various political and security issues.¹² Until its replacement in May 1997 with the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), NACC grew up to include 38 members from CEE and former Soviet Union, and provided a multilateral forum for discussions, consultation and sharing of information with regard to a wide range of topics such as: political, economic, military and security related matters; defense planning and

⁸ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed*, United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998, p.73

⁹ "The Alliance Strategic Concept Agreed by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council", <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicctxt>, 1991

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed*, United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998, p.74

¹² Declaration on Peace and Cooperation Issued by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council (Including Decisions Leading to the Creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) ("The Rome Declaration"), <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicctxt>, 1991

conversion issues; civil emergency planning and humanitarian assistance; peacekeeping; science; challenges of modern society; policy planning consultations; air traffic management, etc.¹³

NACC's core mission was to assist the partner countries to defuse their mutual security suspicions through a set of confidence-building measures and consultation mechanisms and by promoting a long-term understanding of national and multilateral security concerns.¹⁴ NACC activities consisted mainly of meetings – workshops, seminars, conferences, colloquiums, and so forth. However, NACC was not intended to provide a road map for NATO membership, nor to extend any security guaranties to the partner countries. NACC membership was limited from the outset to NATO and former adversaries (Warsaw Pact states and their successors) because it was conceived as a means to overcome the divisive legacy of the Cold War. Changing international conditions and growing pressure from the CEE countries in the direction of deeper political and military cooperation pushed NATO to design a mechanism able to strike a balance between the security concerns of the aspirant countries and those of Russia, while at the same time to keep NATO in control over the political decision and timelines of the enlargement process.

B. PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

The Partnership for Peace was first proposed by US Secretary of Defense Les Aspin at an informal meeting of NATO defense ministers in Travemünde, Germany, in October 1993; it was formally approved three months later, at NATO's January 1994 Brussels summit.

The aim of the Partnership is to enhance stability and security throughout Europe. The Partnership for Peace Invitation was addressed to all states participating in the NACC and other states participating in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) able and willing to contribute to the program. The invitation has since been accepted by a total of 30 countries. Its purposes were defined as follows:

At a pace and scope determined by the capacity and desire of the individual participating states, we will work in concrete ways towards

¹³ "Work Plan for Dialogue, Partnership and Cooperation", <http://www.nato.int/pfp/pfp.htm>

¹⁴ Sean Key, *NATO and the Future of European Security*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998, p.66

transparency in defense budgeting, promoting democratic control of defense ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed.¹⁵

In strategic terms, PfP served three main goals for the Alliance: it established a process with membership as a target for some partners; it allowed for self-differentiation among partner states without extending the full benefits of NATO membership to the partners; and it supported the Alliance's mission of exporting stability as envisioned in the 1991 Strategic Concept. At the same time, the partner countries interested in membership were given more access to NATO's political and military bodies and were offered a flexible and practical set of mechanisms that went far beyond the soft dialogue and cooperation framework institutionalized by the NACC. As for their main concern, the PfP invitation made clear that active participation in the Partnership for Peace would play an important role in the evolutionary process of expansion of NATO, but the degree of involvement in PfP was voluntarily, at a pace and scope decided by each Partner. The diplomatic language of the initial documents and meetings satisfied every actor, no matter how different its attitude towards NATO enlargement. The ambiguity over what a vague open-door statement meant is what created support for PfP program. Those opposed to NATO expansion believed that promoting PfP would leave any decisions on enlargement for later. Those in the middle were comfortable with signaling that an eventual expansion was favored but nothing concrete had been done. Finally, proponents for enlargement were pleased since they believed that such a statement would help to move the process along.¹⁶

The PfP program focuses on defense-related cooperation to forge a real partnership between each Partner country and NATO. It has become an important and permanent feature of the European security architecture and is helping to expand and intensify political and military cooperation throughout Europe. The program is helping to increase stability, to diminish threats to peace and to build strengthened security relationships based on the practical cooperation and commitment to democratic principles which underpin the Alliance. In accordance with the PfP Framework Document,

¹⁵ North Atlantic Council declaration, January 11, 1994, par.4

¹⁶ James M. Goldgeier, *Not Whether But When – The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO*, Brookings Institution Press, Washington D.C., 1999, p41-42

NATO undertakes to consult with any active Partner if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security.¹⁷

In practical terms, PfP set out an important agenda, covering five major areas. First, it made participation to the program contingent upon adherence of the partner countries to the Partnership main values: protection and promotion of fundamental freedoms and human rights, and safeguarding of freedom, justice, and peace through democracy. In addition, the partner countries were asked to commit themselves

To refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, to respect existing borders and to settle disputes by peaceful means [and] to fulfill in good faith the obligations of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights [as well as] the Helsinki Final Act and all subsequent CSCE documents.¹⁸

The Framework Document included specific undertakings to be made by each participant to cooperate with NATO in fulfilling the objectives of the program as a whole. They are as follows:

- to facilitate transparency in national defense planning and budgeting processes;
- to ensure democratic control of defense forces;
- to maintain the capability and readiness to contribute to operations under the authority of the United Nations and/or the responsibility of the OSCE;
- to develop cooperative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training and exercises, in order to strengthen the ability of PfP participants to undertake missions in the field of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations, and others as may subsequently be agreed; and
- to develop, over the longer term, forces that are better able to operate with those of the members of the North Atlantic Alliance.¹⁹

Second, the PfP established a concrete and structured program of political and military collaboration consisting of:

¹⁷ NATO Handbook, Office of Information and Press, Brussels, 1999, p. 87

¹⁸ Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, "Partnership for Peace: Framework Document", <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/>, 1994

¹⁹ Ibid.

- a) The preparation and implementation of NAC 16 + 1 Partner *Individual Partnership Programs (IPP)* listing the necessary steps for promoting transparency in defense planning and budgeting, for ensuring the democratic control of armed forces, for identifying the financial, personnel, military and other assets that might be used for Partnership activities, as well as for carrying out the PfP agreed exercises in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, and humanitarian operations. The selection of activities is made by each Partner separately, on the basis of its individual requirements and priorities. This principle of self-differentiation is an important aspect of PfP which recognizes that the needs and situations of each Partner country vary and that it is for each one of them to identify the forms of activity and cooperation most suited to their needs;²⁰
- b) Establishing *permanent liaison officers* to a separate Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) at Mons, Belgium, that would have access to certain NATO technical data and standardized agreements (STANAGS) relevant to the interoperability and who would be in charge of carrying out the military planning necessary to implement the Partnership programs;²¹
- c) Developing a *Planning and Review Process (PARP)* intended to simulate the NATO defense planning process and aimed at providing a basis for identifying and evaluating forces and capabilities that might be made available by partner countries for multinational training, exercises, and operations in conjunction with Alliance forces.²² The activities were initially derived from 45 generic Interoperability Objectives (IO) which covered areas relating to the full spectrum of Peace Support Operations and Humanitarian Aid, acting as PFP “Force Goals”;
- d) The joint preparation by NATO and the partner countries of the *Partnership Work Program (PWP)*, serving as the basic menu for the preparation of the yearly IPP and listing 21 activities –from Air Defense and Crisis Management

²⁰ NATO Handbook, <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030201.htm>

²¹ Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), “Partnership Coordination Cell”, <http://www.shape.nato.int/PFP/pcc.htm>,

²² Ibid.

to Military Geography and Language Training – offered by NATO bodies (HQ, staffs, agencies or schools), NATO nations and Partner nations in the framework of PfP.²³ The PWP consisted basically of two main sections: the Generic section laid down the general areas in which Partners should strive to achieve interoperability, the Specific section laid down the next year's program of activities.²⁴

Third, besides its regularly scheduled peacekeeping exercises and seminars, the PfP allowed partner countries to gain operational experience in the NATO command structure by taking part in NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR) and then Stabilization Force (SFOR) missions in Bosnia. By June 1996, 12 PfP countries, including Romania, joined NATO forces in Bosnia, adding nearly 10,000 personnel to IFOR.²⁵ IFOR and SFOR operations had a positive contribution to the PfP process by making clear the strengths and weaknesses of coordinating a multinational operation in this new context, and by highlighting several critical interoperability problems for the partner countries in terms of military planning, resource allocation, language training, and communication equipment.

Fourth, the PfP served as an important conceptual and operational blueprint for most of the ensuing discussions concerning NATO enlargement. Thus, NATO's 1995 Study on Enlargement reiterated the political objectives of the Alliance as stated in the PfP Framework Document and called upon prospective members to:

- Conform to basic principles embodied in the Washington Treaty: democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law;
- Accept NATO as a community of like-minded nations joined together for collective defense and the preservation of peace and security, with each nation contributing to the security and defense from which all member nations benefit; and

²³ Partnership Work Programme for 2000-2001: <http://www.nato.int/pfp/docu/d990616a.htm>

²⁴ Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), "Guide to Partnership for Peace (PfP)"

²⁵ SHAPE, "Implementation Force", <http://www.shape.nato.int/PFP/impforc1.htm>

- Be firmly committed to principles, objectives and undertakings included in the Partnership for Peace Framework Document.²⁶

Moreover, the study insisted that in the process of preparation for membership “premature development of measures outside PfP for possible new members should be avoided.”²⁷ Consequently, the PfP was confirmed as the key instrument to be used by the candidate countries to streamline their political and military preparation for NATO membership.

Finally, the PfP created the premises for a timely exposure of several shortcomings hindering NATO’s multinational coordination efforts. It has been thus argued that PfP unintentionally encouraged CEE countries to compete against each other at the expense of their bilateral relations, that it favored military-to-military cooperation with the potential to undermine the civil- military reforms in the region, that it led PfP countries to stress quantity over quality in their programs, that it promoted only limited transparency, and, that it deflected the military preparation of the partner countries from more traditional sources of threat.²⁸ In order to address better these issues, the June 1997 meeting in Sintra, Portugal agreed on a new set of proposals to further enhance PfP and NACC.

C. THE EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL (EAPC)

Given the predominant military dimension of the PfP, the perceived inefficiency of NACC, and the determination to keep politically connected those partner countries that were not interested in NATO membership and those interested but not yet selectable, the Sintra ministerial meeting and the subsequent Madrid summit decided to raise to a qualitatively new level the political and military cooperation between NATO and the partner countries by establishing *the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)*, as the successor to NACC, and by enhancing the PfP.²⁹ The EAPC was thus designed to increase the participation of the partner countries in the decision-making and consultation

²⁶“Study on NATO Enlargement”, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/enl-9506.htm>

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Sean Kay, “NATO and The Future of European Security”, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Hardback. 1998, p 73-73

²⁹ “Basic Document of the Euro -Atlantic Partnership Council”, <http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt>

process and to expand the scope of political and security-related issues to be discussed within its framework.

The key elements of its structure consisted of:

- a) regular meetings at the ambassadorial and ministerial level;
- b) closer cooperation with the Political-Military Steering Committee (PMSC), the Political Committee (PC), and the Military Committee (MC); and
- c) a four-tiered Action Plan that included PWP and previous NACC issue areas, Civil Emergency planning and disaster preparedness, PfP areas of cooperation, and short-term planning for EAPC consultations and practical cooperation.³⁰

One of the political goals has been to transform EAPC into a NATO body capable of preventing the next “out of area” regional crisis by enhancing PfP’s emphasis on crisis management, counterterrorism, and disaster response.

At the operational level, following the more formal 1996 PfP Enhancement program, *the enhanced PfP* stipulated several changes:

- a) to foster greater regional cooperation and participation, including in the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), through regional peace enforcement and crisis management exercises;
- b) to increase partner access to NATO procedures and documents beyond PCC by creating Partnership for Peace Staff Elements (PSEs) at the first and second level of NATO integrated military structure; and
- c) to expand PARP to encourage partner states to adopt a new system of defense planning, create local defense policy experts, increase interoperability standards, and define a genuine mechanism of feedback between NATO and its partners.

Prior to the admission into the Alliance of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic and reinforced at the Madrid Summit in July 1997, the intensified dialogue process (IDP) was offered to all aspirant countries to NATO membership as a supplementary element to assist their preparation and keep them engaged in the PfP.

³⁰ “The Birth and Development of the EAPC Idea”, <http://www.nato.int/pfp/eapc.htm>

Primarily focused on political factors, IDP was scheduled to take place biannually at the level of the NAC+1 Partner, plus an additional dialogue conducted by a NATO team.

Growing concern for enhancing interoperability between NATO members and the partner countries and for preserving the military effectiveness of the Alliance resulted in new sets of recommendations. Thus, the Concept for Implementation of PfP published in May 1996 identified what was meant by interoperability and how to build a program to support the achievement of interoperability. The Concept worked within and supplemented PARP and it embedded two levels of interoperability:

- Interoperability Requirements (MIR) – 26 broad statements of those areas in which Partners should achieve interoperability in order to be better able to operate with NATO;
- Tasks for Interoperability (MTI) - detailed tasks identified by the MNCs as being necessary to achieve each MIR.³¹

In June 1998, the EAPC Defense Ministerial meeting agreed to develop new procedures that would *expand and adapt the PARP* in order to make it resemble more closely with NATO Defense Planning Process. The new procedures included the addition of PARP Ministerial Guidance, Partnership Goals and the extension of the planning horizon to six years. The new Partnership Goals (PO) were intended to replace by 2000 the previous Interoperability Objectives (IOs), to enhance Alliance's capacity to operate in non-Article 5 crisis management situations, to assist the partners in developing interoperable capabilities, and to better help the aspiring countries for membership.

D. THE NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT

In line with the evolution of the Euro-Atlantic security environment of the first post-Cold War decade, the 1999 NATO *New Strategic Concept* acknowledged that the risks to the security of the Alliance “are multi-directional and often difficult to predict.”³² Besides nuclear proliferation and less likely large-scale conventional aggression or nuclear attack, they include:

³¹ Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), “Guide to Partnership for Peace PfP”, <http://www.shape.nato.int/PFP.HTM>

³² “The Alliance's Strategic Concept Approved by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council”, <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>

uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance, which could evolve rapidly. Ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states can lead to local and even regional instability.³³

In order to address these sources of insecurity, the Alliance committed itself to a multi-dimensional approach that included political, economic, social and environmental factors in addition to the indispensable defense dimension. Hence, the fundamental security tasks to be performed are: a) security, based on the growth of democratic institutions; b) consultation as provided by Article 4 of the Washington Treaty; c) traditional deterrence and defense; d) crisis management; and e) partnership.³⁴

Given the interoperability problems revealed during its intervention in Kosovo, NATO supplemented its 1999 Strategic Concept with two new initiatives. The first one, *the Defense Capabilities Initiative*, was primarily targeted at the Alliance members and set as its objective the improvement of defense capabilities to ensure the effectiveness of future NATO-led multinational operations, especially those outside the territory of the Alliance. A temporary High Level Steering Group (HLSG) was put in charge of overseeing the implementation of the DCI.³⁵ The second initiative, *the Operational Capabilities Concept for NATO-led PfP Operations* (OCC), was designed to improve the interoperability between Allied and Partner forces and increase their ability to operate together in future NATO-led PfP operations. To reach this goal, OCC made provisions for five sets of mechanisms: a) Pool(s) of Forces and Capabilities; b) Established Multinational Formations; c) Peacetime Working Relationships; d) Assessment and Feedback Mechanisms; and e) Enabling Mechanisms.³⁶ In addition, OCC took also into account improvements to PfP Training and Education, as well as to multi-nationality in the command and operational structure.

³³ "The Alliance's Strategic Concept Approved by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council", <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>

³⁴ "The Alliance's Strategic Concept Approved by the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council", <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99-065e.htm>

³⁵ "Defense Capabilities Initiative", <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99s069e.htm>

³⁶ "Towards a Partnership for the 21st Century: Appendix D - Operational Capabilities Concept for NATO-led PfP Operations", <http://www.nato.int/pfp/docu/d990615e.htm>

E. MEMBERSHIP ACTION PLAN

The most recent and probably the most comprehensive and important NATO document governing the relationships with the CEE aspiring countries is the Membership Action Plan (MAP) approved at the NATO's Washington Summit in April 1999. At the same meeting, Allied leaders promised that the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland would not be the last new countries to join NATO and stated that the enlargement process would be reviewed in 2002. Building on the Intensified Individual Dialogue on membership questions, MAP was designed to reinforce the Open Door policy of the Alliance and its firm commitment to further enlargement by putting into place a program of activities to assist the aspiring countries in their preparations for possible future membership. While stressing that the list of issues included did not constitute criteria, guarantees nor a timeframe for membership, MAP required each aspiring country to draw up an annual national program containing specific information and implementation measures with regard to five chapters:

- a) Political and Economic issues: These include settling any international, ethnic or external territorial disputes by peaceful means; demonstrating a commitment to the rule of law and human rights; establishing democratic control of their armed forces; and promoting stability and well-being through economic liberty, social justice, environmental responsibility, commitment to democracy, rule of law, human rights, peaceful settlement of international disputes, etc.;
- b) Defense and Military issues: enhance interoperability and PARP, adopt the new Strategic concept, and provide forces and capabilities for collective defense and other Alliance missions;
- c) Resource allocation able to meet defense priorities and participation in Alliance structures;
- d) Security issues concerning the safeguards and procedures to ensure the protection of the most sensitive information; and
- e) Legal issues: incorporation of NATO's "acquis" - legal arrangements and agreements which govern cooperation within the Alliance.³⁷

³⁷"NATO's Membership Action Plan", <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/nato-map.htm>, 2000

The MAP comprises the following elements:

- Each aspirant is invited to submit an annual national program on its preparations for possible membership, covering the five chapters mentioned above. This program should set objectives and targets on all issues relevant to membership. It should also provide specific information on steps being taken, responsible authorities and, where appropriate, a schedule of work on specific aspects.
- A focused feedback mechanism on progress made by each aspirant on its programs is established to provide both political and technical advice. Meetings take place in a 19+1 format with the NAC and other NATO bodies if requested, and with a NATO Team. The NATO Team will include specialists on the specific subjects to be discussed from NATO's International Staff, the International Military Staff, and the NATO Major Commands. Feedback and advice on MAP issues is provided through mechanisms based on those currently in use with Partners (for instance in the PfP framework), as well as 19+1 meetings and NATO Team workshops. The workshops are particularly valuable, as they enable in-depth discussion among experts on the entire spectrum of issues relevant to membership.
- Annual clearinghouse meetings with each aspirant at 19+1 help dovetail bilateral and multilateral assistance in the defense/military field to the country concerned with the aim of maximizing the effectiveness of assistance programs.
- Planning targets are elaborated with aspiring countries to cover the areas most directly relevant to nations seeking to align their force structures and capabilities with the responsibilities involved in eventual Alliance membership. These are built on existing Partnership Goals and are subject to review, allowing for detailed feedback.³⁸

Each spring, the Alliance draws up a report for individual aspirants providing feedback focused on their progress in the areas covered in their individual national

³⁸ "NATO's Membership Action Plan", <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/2000/nato-map.htm>, 2000

programs. This document forms the basis for an annual spring meeting of the NAC with each individual aspirant.

The MAP does not replace the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. In fact, participation in PfP for aspiring countries remains essential, as it provides a well-established way of developing progressive interoperability with Alliance forces. Moreover, the Washington Summit put into place a coherent package of measures for a more operational Partnership, to strengthen the ability of Allies and all Partner countries, including membership aspirants, to work together. The provisions of the MAP complement these activities available under PfP by addressing the broader spectrum of preparations required for eventual membership.

The MAP provides aspiring countries with a variety of opportunities. It is up to them to select and make use of elements of the MAP at their discretion. Like PfP, the MAP is guided by the principle of self-differentiation. Aspirants are free to match their participation with their own national priorities and circumstances and to decide upon their own implementation measures and timetables. They set their own objectives, targets and work schedules. These programs are expected to be updated each year but can be amended at any time. NATO is following the progress made by each aspirant and providing political and technical advice. MAP makes also reference to screening mechanisms in 19+1 format, which are intended to provide constant feedback and advice to the aspirant countries. The Alliance set formal provisions for preparing an annual report that helps aspirant countries identify areas for further action, but it leaves at their discretion the level of commitment for taking further action.

The implementation of the MAP has also ceased to be a matter concerning only ministries of foreign affairs and defense. With the establishment of inter-ministerial meetings at the national level, fulfilling the objectives of the Plan is increasingly engaging other government departments in a coordinated and systematic effort.

Like most of its neighbors, Romania suffers from a myriad of history-induced anxieties, phobias, and national ego problems, accentuated by its position at the crossroads of Western, Slavic, and Middle Eastern cultures. There is the fear of Russia threatening the country and of Hungarians plotting to reconquer Transylvania; the constant feeling of victimization, of being stabbed in the back or played as a pawn by the

big powers; and above all, there is the insatiable desire to be considered an equal to Western nations--as civilized, as advanced, and as "good" as they are.

NATO membership is also considered an economic issue in Romania. The expectation is that membership would bring an influx of foreign investments that would help today's sluggish, still reforming economy. Even in this time of economic hardship, Romanians are not deterred from accepting higher military costs to enter NATO, precisely because they expected an economic payoff in return.

In 1990, Romania was one of the six countries invited to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO and intensify military contact, it was the first to join PfP, it has been very active in the program, and it followed sincerely the main requirements of the program. These include democratic elections, individual liberty, and the rule of law; demonstrated commitment to economic reform and market economy; adherence to OSCE norms and principles involving ethnic minorities and social justice; resolution of territorial disputes with neighbors; and the establishment of democratic control of the military. In order to overcome all the obstacles a political consensus was necessary. The Snagov Agreement, signed by all political parties represented in Parliament of 1995, is the document which shows Romania's commitment for NATO membership and national consensus in the topic.

The restructuring of the Armed Forces was always connected with NATO's Interoperability Objectives and later on Partnership Goals. The centerpiece of Romania's changes has been fulfillment of NATO standards.

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IV. ROMANIAN-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS

Drawing on the overview of the post Cold War evolution of NATO's relationship with the CEE countries as outlined in the previous section, this chapter and the next one will make an assessment of the institutional and normative effects entailed by this relationship on Romanian national security. This chapter focuses on Romania's relations with Hungary, while the next chapter examines the defense budget and downsizing the military personnel as two major aspects of a larger process-the restructuring of the Romanian Armed Forces.

Given the historical pattern of distrust and rivalry between Romania and Hungary, the expectation of traditional perspectives, which doubt the ability of international institutions to influence state behavior on major security concerns, would be that NATO's pressure has had only a limited impact of the bilateral relations between the two countries. Evidence to the contrary will give credit to the idea that NATO's multilateral strategy has eventually paid off, and Romanian-Hungarian relations are currently experiencing a dynamic process of building trust, cooperation and good neighbor relations.

A. THE EVOLUTION OF ROMANIAN-HUNGARIAN RELATIONS

Following the collapse of the communist regimes, the relationship between the two countries as it emerged between 1990 and 1994 was that between two moderately nationalist states. However, the continuing deterioration of the Hungarian-Romanian relationship before 1994 was stopped and reversed by the launch of the Partnership for Peace program and the subsequent NATO engagement programs. PfP offered an excellent window of opportunity for non-nationalist political forces from both countries to take control over the bilateral normalization process and put it on an ascendant course. Despite ongoing political frictions, it is probably safe to assume that in absence of NATO's partnership programs, the political tensions between Romania and Hungary would have been deeper and would have required more time as well as more domestic and international efforts to heal.

Between 1990 and 1994, the political transition of Romania to democracy proved difficult, unstable and occasionally tragic. The initial diplomatic breakthrough and

international sympathy attained immediately after the violent overthrow of the communist regime in December 1989 had evaporated within only six months as a result of successive brutal assaults on the political opposition and intellectuals, executed by miner squads summoned up and organized by the first post-communist president Ion Iliescu and his ruling party. The bloody ethnic clash between Romanians and ethnic Hungarians in Tirgu-Mures, Romania, in March 1990 revealed deep-rooted ethnic tensions and sent a chill through both parties as well as the Western European community. The country's international standing was further weakened by the political coalition the Iliescu government formed between 1992 and 1996 with two extremist, ultra-nationalist parties well known for their aggressive rhetoric targeted at the Hungarian and Roma minorities.³⁹

Incapable of change and democratic adaptation, the ruling political elite found increasing refuge in nationalistic and anti-Western rhetoric. In the words of an influential Iliescu official and then Minister of Defense, the sole explanation for the critical problems facing the country could be found in international conspiracies, implicitly orchestrated by Hungary:

Soon, the old web of international isolation was reactivated, as if someone somewhere became frightened by the advantage Romania might obtain given its relatively large potential compared to the other East European countries.⁴⁰

These statements were echoed by the first post-communist National Security Doctrine, submitted to the Parliament for approval in September 1994, which besides "revisionist tendencies" included references to the dangers posed by "distorted perceptions" of Romania's internal evolution in other countries.⁴¹ The ambiguous commitment toward full political and economic reform, the "suspect ideological baggage and questionable political behavior of the Iliescu regime,"⁴² as well as the strained

³⁹ For more details on this topic see, Tom Gallagher, *Romania after Ceausescu*, Edinburgh University Press, 1995

⁴⁰ Ioan Mircea Pascu, "Romania's Response to a Restructured World", in Daniel N. Nelson, *Romania After Tyranny*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1997, p.277

⁴¹ Romanian Ministry of Defense, *Conceptia Integrata privind Securitatea nationala a Romaniei*, draft submitted for approval to the Romanian Parliament, Sept. 1994

⁴² Ronald H. Lynden, "After the Revolution: A Foreign Policy of Bounded Change" in Daniel N. Nelson, *Romania After Tyranny*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1997, p.222

political relations with neighboring countries (Hungary and to a lesser extent Bulgaria) all contributed before the 1996 elections to placing Romania in an international quasi-quarantine.

In the case of Hungary, the process of internalization of a cooperative and democratic set of norms of international conduct has been taking place faster and apparently more firmly than in Romania, but not without problems. The priorities of the Hungarian foreign policy during the 1990s consisted in pursuing a dual track strategy: to become a full member of the Western community and to protect the rights of the Hungarian minorities living in the neighboring countries. Tensions started to accumulate when the second foreign policy objective became framed into a public rhetoric that invoked historical memories of Greater Hungary. Thus, the first post-communist Prime Minister Jozsef Antall declared in August 1990 that “he considered himself in spirit to be the Prime Minister of all 15 millions Hungarians,”⁴³ including approximately five million ethnic Hungarians living outside Hungary, a declaration that triggered angry reactions among the neighboring countries and immediately attracted harsh international criticism.⁴⁴

Another hotly debated action met with pressure by the Western European governments, especially Germany, was the decision of the Antall government to block Romania’s admittance to the Council of Europe until 1993, in order to force the Romanian government to improve the situation of the Hungarian minority. In addition, insistent appeals to granting collective rights, regional autonomy and self-government to the Hungarian ethnic communities from the region coupled with an ambiguous security policy on the question of borders, led the international community to conclude by 1994 that Hungary was not contributing to stability in Central Europe but rather that it was undermining it, and hence it started to question the legitimacy of Hungarian membership in the Euro-Atlantic institutions.⁴⁵

⁴³ Kerry S. McNamara, “*Hungary Between East and West: The Dilemma over Yugoslavia*”, Case program – Kennedy School of Government, 1995

⁴⁴ Robert M. Bigler, “*Back in Europe and Adjusting to the New Realities of the 1990 in Hungary*”, East European Quarterly, vol. 30, Summer 96, Issue 2

⁴⁵ Pál Dunay, “Theological Debates on NATO in Hungary”, Foreign Policy, Vol. 3, Special Issue, 1997

As will be argued in more detail in the next sub-section, the Partnership for Peace program was launched at the moment when the political and military bilateral relations between Romania and Hungary were practically frozen. However, changing political conditions at the domestic level provided a window of opportunity for non-nationalist political forces to turn PfP into an efficient instrument for reducing the political tensions between the two countries and for improving the general stability of the region. Thus, the Hungarian social-liberal government elected in 1994 set as new political priorities: "... the process of accession to the EU and accession to NATO or creation of the opportunities for this. The government will subordinate everything else to this."⁴⁶ Similarly, the governmental coalition of the new Romanian president Emil Constantinescu, which took power in November 1996 and which included the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR) as one of its members, acknowledged that NATO "had a highly positive, perhaps even decisive, influence in stabilizing the Romanian-Hungarian relations" and promised to transform the bilateral relationship into a "hard core of stability in Central Europe."⁴⁷

B. NATO ENGAGEMENT

The strategic political objectives of NATO in relation with the aspirant countries have been consistently reiterated in all major statements and documents starting with the Rome Declaration in 1991, the Partnership for Peace Framework Document in 1994, the EAPC Basic Document in 1997, and finally the Membership Action Plan in April 1999. These objectives have been translated into practice through various partnership programs and have imposed serious constraints on the capacity of the candidate countries to go to war against each other. This proposition does not imply that Hungary and Romania have lost their military capacity to pursue war against each other as a consequence of their collaboration with NATO. It only contends that NATO's institutional engagement with Hungary and Romania has substantively changed the terms of the bilateral framework between the two countries, by increasing institutional incentives for political and military cooperation. The validity of this claim can be examined in two steps. The first one

⁴⁶ Gyula Horn, "*Contribution to the Debate on Foreign Affairs in the Hungarian Parliament*", Current Policy, no. 3a, 1995

⁴⁷ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Romania, "*White Book on Romania and NATO*", <http://kappa.ro/mae/>

explores the level of institutional engagement between NATO and the two countries, at both the political and military level. The second one assesses the impact of this variable on the Hungarian-Romanian bilateral relationship at the level of foreign and military-defense policies. With regard to the first aspect, Tables 1 and 2 provide an evaluation of the degree of political and military institutional commitment between NATO and the two countries.

	NACC	PfP	IID	EAPC	MAP
Hungary	X	X	X	X	-
Romania	X	X	X	X	X

Table 2: *Level of Political Engagement with NATO*

Following its admission into the Alliance in April 1999, Hungary entered a new phase of institutional engagement, a fact that explains the missing data from the corresponding MAP and Enhanced PfP columns. The two tables suggest that at both political and military level, the degree of institutional engagement between NATO and the two countries has been constantly high. The political rapprochement initiated by NATO in the early days of the 1990s toward the former Warsaw Treaty members has been steadily developing into a complex relationship of cooperation resting on solid political and military pillars. Moreover, both countries joined almost immediately all political initiatives and operational programs set forth by NATO and followed relatively closely the requirements for partnership and membership. Actually, NATO has had no problems in convincing the two countries to join its programs, but rather in accommodating their unrelenting demands for further political and military cooperation.

	PfP				Enhanced PfP				MAP ⁴⁸			
	IPP	PCC	PARP	PWP	IFOR/ SFOR	PSE	Bi-MNC& ExPARP	RCE	D&M	RA	SI	LM
Hungary	X	X	X	X	X	-	X	X	-	-	-	-
Romania	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Table 3: *Level of Military Engagement with NATO*

⁴⁸ Refers to the military-related chapters of the annual national program: defense-military including the OCC concept, resource allocation, security information, and legal matters

While illustrative from a quantitative point of view, the two tables are unfortunately silent on the quality of the institutional engagement between NATO and the two countries. The expectation is that gradual convergence of the political and military directions of the two countries to NATO's strategic objectives produces a positive boomerang effect on the relationship between Hungary and Romania.

C. FOREIGN AND MILITARY POLICY DIRECTIONS

Both countries emerged from the communist period with no clearly articulated foreign and military policies, except for two enthusiastic but nevertheless vague and contradictory ambitions: to integrate themselves as soon as possible into the Euro-Atlantic political-military structures (NATO, EU, WEU, Council of Europe) and to uphold the nationalist basis of state power. It is actually the merit of NATO and the EU to channel the foreign and military policy efforts of both countries towards pursuing the first objective and to help prevent nationalist U-turns. The strong political and military engagement of both countries with NATO illustrated in Table 1 and 2 was paralleled by a four-stage evolution of the Romanian-Hungarian military and political relationship. First, the number of cooperation agreements (see Graph 1) between the two states increased steadily, especially after the launch of the PfP in January 1994 and the changes of government in Hungary and Romania in 1994 and 1996 respectively.




Figure 1: *Romanian-Hungarian Major Bilateral Agreements*⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Romanian and Hungarian Ministries of Foreign Affairs

Second, under NATO/US pressure, political normalization followed suit with the conclusion of the Treaty of Understanding, Cooperation and Good Neighborly Relations (the Basic Treaty) in 1996, which besides guaranteeing the inviolability of borders and the territorial integrity of each party, stated provisions for regular consultations on issues concerning security, defense, regional stability and mutual support for integration into NATO, EU and WEU.⁵⁰

Third, the previous adversarial stance has gradually given way after 1996 to a cooperative relationship resting on relatively strong institutional ties and improved policy coordination. A Joint Intergovernmental Commission for Cooperation and Active Partnership was established in October 1997 as a means to promote transparency, generate feedback and convey mutual assistance on all key bilateral issues, especially those related to Euro-Atlantic integration. In the military realm, a joint peacekeeping battalion composed of 500 soldiers from each country had been agreed upon in March 1998 and became operational one year later, having as one of its missions the transfer of expertise that Hungary has gained from its recent NATO membership.⁵¹




Figure 2: Romanian-Hungarian Official High-level Meetings⁵²

⁵⁰ "Treaty Between the Republic of Hungary and Romania on Understanding, Cooperation and Good Neighborhood", <http://www.htmh.hu/dokumentumok/asz-ro-e.htm>:1996:

⁵¹ Stephen R. Burant, "After NATO Enlargement: Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, and the Problem of Further European Integration", *Problems of Post-Communism* 48, 2 (March/April). p.37

⁵² Romanian and Hungarian Ministries of Foreign Affairs

Fourth, following the 1998 election of the conservative coalition in Hungary and the return to power of Iliescu's party in Romania in November 2000 the level of bilateral contacts between the two countries has receded sharply (see Graph 2). However, neither the bilateral military relationship nor the general institutional setting presents yet visible signs of disruption, although this situation may reverse swiftly in the near future. It is nevertheless true that despite the general positive trend, the sound political and military engagement between NATO and the two countries has not been yet rendered into similar vigorous patterns of bilateral cooperation between Hungary and Romania.

Table 3 provides grounds for optimism concerning the possibility of developing a security community in the CEE region. NATO's robust political and military engagement with Hungary and Romania has proved indeed conducive to the improvement of the bilateral relationships between the two countries at the level of foreign and military policy directions.

Subject	Date
1. Agreement between the Governments of the Republic of Hungary and Romania on the establishment of an Open Skies regime	May 11, 1991
2. Agreement between the Governments of the Republic of Hungary and Romania on confidence- and security-building measures complementing the 1994 Vienna Document of the OSCE and on the development of military relations	September 16, 1996
3. Treaty between the Republic of Hungary and Romania on mutual understanding, cooperation and good-neighborliness (the Basic Treaty)	September 16, 1996
4. Protocol between the Governments of the Republic of Hungary and Romania on the establishment of an intergovernmental Joint Committee on cooperation and active partnership between the Republic of Hungary and Romania and its Terms of Reference	March 10, 1997
5. Protocol on cooperation between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Hungary and Romania	March 12, 1997
6. Agreement between the Governments of the Republic of Hungary and Romania on the establishment of a joint peacekeeping battalion	March 20, 1998

Table 4: *Romanian-Hungarian Major Political-military Agreements*

The conclusion of the Basic Treaty has been followed by two concrete measures regarding the establishment of a joint committee of partnership and a joint peacekeeping battalion. Both of these two initiatives are animated by intense activity.

The examination of the evolution of the international positions of Hungary and Romania during the past decade suggests that NATO's magnetism has indeed exerted a great deal of positive influence on the foreign and military directions of both countries, but it has failed so far to eliminate the issue of national minorities as the main source of mistrust and political tension between them.

D. ECONOMIC COOPERATION

The economic cooperation between Romania and Hungary has been positive, characterized by a slow but steady increase of the level of trade (see Graph 3) and mutual investments.




Figure 3: *Romanian-Hungarian Trade Relations (USD mil)*⁵³

The growth of Hungarian-Romanian foreign trade increased significantly after the 1997 entry of Romania into the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), but slowed down slightly thereafter as a result of the market protection measures introduced by the Romanian side in June 1999 with respect to imports of Hungarian pork and poultry. Hungarian investment in Romania amounted before 2000 to a total of 196 million USD, a figure that has placed Hungary 10th among countries investing in

⁵³ Romanian and Hungarian Ministries of Foreign Affairs

Romania, the 7th in terms of the total volume of commercial exchange, and the 1st in terms of the strongest commercial partner among Romania's neighbors.⁵⁴ During the same period, the level of Romanian investment in Hungary was only 38 million USD strong, mirroring the growing gap between the economic outputs of the two countries. The commercial transactions for the first three months of 2001 increased by 148 per cent comparing with the same period of the preceding year.⁵⁵ However, further deterioration of the political relations between the two governments in the context of the "Status Law"⁵⁶ and accumulating commercial deficit on the Romanian side, will most probably prompt the Romanian government in the coming months to tighten market protection measures against Hungarian products.

E. SUMMARY

After the fall of communism, newly-found freedoms of speech and expression facilitated the emergence of radical nationalism, which had formerly been suppressed by authorities for more than four decades. The collapse of communism brought with it uncertainty and confusion. In Yugoslavia nationalism became the motivating force for unifying the nation. In Romania, motivation emanated from the desire to integrate with the Euro-Atlantic institutions, to create a stable and secure environment. The motivation centered on gaining entry into organizations that had epitomized everything democratic and Western, organizations such as NATO and the EU. This necessitated cooperation not only among the numerous ethnic groups within Romania, but with Romania's neighbors. This necessitated cooperation in both internal and external arenas.

It was Romania's quest for NATO membership that pushed democratic parties to introduce the Hungarian minority party into the government in 1996. They proceeded to perform an unusual exercise in Romanian political life: negotiations to build a Western democracy. Romania was a strong candidate for NATO enlargement in 1997 because of

⁵⁴ Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mfa.gov.hu>

⁵⁵ The Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mae.ro>

⁵⁶ The law entitles ethnic Hungarians living in Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, Yugoslavia, and Slovenia to a number of benefits (annual three-month work permit in Hungary, medical care and pension benefits, free training for Hungarian teachers living in neighboring countries, \$80 annual allowance for Hungarian families living outside Hungary if they have at least two children who attend a Hungarian-language school). Romanian officials have expressed dissatisfaction with the status law, calling it an extraterritorial measure that violates the bilateral treaty. For more details on this topic see Eugen Tomiuc, "Hungary: Status Law Causing Dispute With Neighbors", Radio Free Europe: <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2001/10/04102001123954.asp>, October 4, 2001

the peaceful and cooperative solution in dealing with the Hungarian minority. The benefits of such a solution were acknowledged by the Social Democrat Party, which came in power after 2000 elections, and the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR) continues to be part of the ruling coalition. The Romanian-Hungarian case confirms the idea that the level of international institutions impact depends on the congruence with domestic ruling coalitions.

Romania and Hungary have been working together in their quest for entry into the Euro-Atlantic institutions. NATO's programs and structures addressed topics such as good relations with neighbors, including no having border disputes. The Romanian political institutions were encouraged to fulfill NATO's clear roadmap of requirements in order to make the country part of the international organizations. The most relevant aspect is that the Basic Treaty between Romania and Hungary was signed in preparation for the Madrid Summit. Both countries came to the meeting with their lessons done. Without NATO's pressure it is hard to believe that the document might had been signed after only several months of negotiations and one official high-level meeting (the second official high-level meeting happened when the Basic Treaty was signed). The Basic Treaty with Hungary has significantly "legitimized" Romania's efforts to establish good neighbor relations in the West's view. Western pressure in relation to NATO enlargement played a decisive role in persuading the two sides to resolve their differences over the bilateral treaty. NATO members, in particular the United States, made clear to both countries that they would not be able to join the Alliance unless they signed the bilateral treaty. Only after this was the treaty signed. "The high-level, forceful, frank interference" of the West on this issue is pointed out by the declarations of the US ambassadors to Hungary and Romania that "both sides are committed because they know that the treaty clears an important hurdle to an even more historic goal: integration with the West."⁵⁷ The Hungarian-Romanian treaty illustrates how the incentive of NATO membership provided a major impetus to efforts to overcome a long-standing dispute in Central and Eastern Europe.

Within the NATO framework, bilateral relations between Romania and Hungary are evolving from historic reconciliation to genuine partnership.

⁵⁷ Pal Dunay, *"Hungarian-Romanian Relations: a Changed Paradigm?"*, Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union, Paris, 1997, p. 19

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V. RESTRUCTURING THE ROMANIAN ARMED FORCES

Romania has undertaken significant steps in reforming its defense institutions and aligning its military to NATO compatibility standards in terms of the structure of the armed forces, proper equipment, infrastructure and adequate levels of readiness. In the words of a former Romanian Minister of Defense, the ultimate objective is to

...transform the military from a mass army designed for mass confrontations to a professional military able to participate efficiently in a large range of missions within both the national and multinational framework.⁵⁸

The restructuring process went through three stages during the 1990-2000 period:⁵⁹

- The goal of the first stage (1994-1994) was to first start to change the structure, eliminate political control by the communist party, and develop a new legislative framework for defense.
- The second stage was characterized by completion of structural reforms, reorganization of the Armed Forces to units similar to those belonging to NATO member states, beginning the process of achieving interoperability with NATO forces based on the PfP program, and reform of the military education system.
- The third stage was characterized by reorganization of the command and staffs in a modular way compatible with NATO structures, development of a new personnel strategy, reconsideration of an officer's professional career, and implementation of the interoperability objectives assumed within PfP.

If the improvement of Romanian-Hungarian relations is largely a matter of political willingness, the capacity of Romania to adjust itself to the requirements of the Alliance, given the inherited structure of the armed forces, decaying Soviet military

⁵⁸ Dr. Victor Babiuc, Romanian Minister of National Defense, "*Reform of the Romanian Armed Forces: Modernization and Interoperability*", in *Romania and Euro-Atlantic Integration*, ed. Kurt W. Treptow and Mihail E. Ionescu (Iasi: The Center for Romanian Studies, 1999)

⁵⁹ Degeratu, Constantin, FARO 2005-2010: The Path Ahead for the Romanian Armed Forces, Military Technology, October 1999. Lt. Gen Constantin Degeratu was the Chief of the Joint Defense Staff of the Romanian Armed Forces between 1997-2000.

technology, and slow pace of military modernization programs concerning personnel policy, hardware modernization, and defense industry reform, raises a lot of difficulties.

Strongly influenced by US defense planning methods and following the 1999 NATO call for a Membership Action Plan (MAP), Romania initiated an interagency process including the MoD, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Justice, and the intelligence service, that resulted in a comprehensive MAP Annual National Plan (ANP) covering defense planning as well as other political, economic, national security, and legal issues.⁶⁰ In addition, the Defense Ministry created the NATO Integration Council in June 1999, in order to facilitate communication and cooperation between the defense ministry and the General Staff in preparing its ANP. However, under conditions of severe economic constraints, the situation of the RAF offers signs for further optimism. Hence, the Chief of the Joint Staff, Gen. Popescu, estimates that Romanian Armed Forces (RAF) cannot achieve military interoperability by NATO standards before 2014-2019, but in operational terms it can catch up relatively quickly with the three recent NATO members.⁶¹ This last objective might be achieved through partnership goals assumed under the PfP PARP. The number of interoperability objectives (IO) and partnership goals (PG) assumed by Romania within the PfP PARP program has evolved as follows: PARP I (1994-1997): 20 IO; PARP II (1997-1999): 44 IO; PARP III (1999-): 84 PGs.⁶²

In order to find the existing similarities between NATO partnership framework development and the restructuring process of the Romanian Armed Forces (RAF), this chapter tries to analyze in more detail two aspects: defense budgeting and military personnel reduction.

A. DEFENSE BUDGETING

The analysis of the Romanian defense budget is mainly based on the data provided by figures 4 and 5. Romania emerged from the centrally planned economy with a big budget for defense in real terms and as a percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). At the beginning of a decade in which most of the European countries and the US

⁶⁰ For details see the “Romanian membership Action Plan for Integration into NATO”, <http://mae.kappa.ro>

⁶¹ Mediafax, “*Romania este candidatul cel mai important pentru al doilea val al largirii NATO, asa cum a fost Polonia in valul anterior, considera seful Statului Major General*”, <http://www.mediafax.ro>:21 June 2001

⁶² For details see “*Parteneriatul pentru pace si extinderea NATO*”, <http://www.mapn.ro/re2000/romana>

reduced dramatically their defense expenditure, Romania followed the same trend for two main reasons:

- the elimination of threat of a major conflict among countries;
- in a democratic society other ministers were able to get more money in order to provide a better standard of living and assure some votes for the parties during the election (industry, health, education).




Figure 4. *Romanian Defense Budget (USD mil)*⁶³

The discussions around NATO as a structure of security in Europe and an organization with a very good record in building trust among members and encouraging democracy influenced the Romanian government to look for a defense budget very similar with those of the NATO countries. In terms of percentage of GDP, Romania approaches the NATO European average of 2.2 percent. In term of the amount of money provided for defense, the NATO enlargement had a very strong influence on the evolution of the budget, after 1996. Before the Madrid summit, Romania showed its determination for NATO membership by increasing defense expenditures. Until September 11, 2001, NATO enlargement was not a welcomed subject and Romania was far away from being included on an eventual list. Consequently, the defense budget has dropped.

⁶³ The Romanian Ministry of National Defense: <http://www.mapn.ro/>

With an economy going down for most of the time in the last decade of the 20th century, the Romanian government has been unable to provide long-term plans and to guarantee resources to build military capabilities. However, with the help of the US Romania was able to develop a multi-year planning programming and budgeting system. The first multi-year planning effort was conducted in April through October 1999. The multi-year plan was used to prepare Romania's MAP necessary for developing forces and capabilities able to operate with NATO under its new Operational Capabilities Concept.




Figure 5. *Romanian Defense Budget (percent of GDP)*

It is hard to predict the evolution of the Romanian defense budget, even though in an official declaration the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mircea Geoana has recently assured NATO that in case of admission in NATO as a member, Romania will keep a defense budget higher than 2.0 percent of GDP.⁶⁴ Any contraction in the Romanian economy will increase the pressure for reducing the overall defense budget. As a result, Romania will be hard pressed to sustain projected defense spending, given the pressure to restrict public sector expenditures. Any reforms will take place under the assumption that public sector spending will remain flat or even shrink in the upcoming years. Therefore, over the short and medium term, any cost incurred restructuring the armed forces will have to be based primarily on the reallocation of resources and cost offsets.

⁶⁴ Radio Free Europe, "Romania: Foreign Minister Says Goal Is To Secure NATO Invitation": <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/03/04032002092652.asp> (4 March, 2002)

B. DOWNSIZING THE MILITARY PERSONNEL

Romania had a defense establishment of 150,000 in 1999, about 55 percent of the 1990 total. In 1998 alone, 11,000 officers and NCOs left the forces, of whom 85 percent were majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels who did not leave happily; 75 percent were over 40 years of age. A graph of officers who have been reduced in 1998-2001 period is presented in figure 6.




Figure 6. *The Number of Officers Leaving the RAF in 1998-2001*⁶⁵

Though the RAF already have substantially downsized, more reductions are to come. Personnel development policy needs to be based upon merit and competition and structured both to correct a reverse officer pyramid and to achieve balance among the officer and NCO corps. Service as a NCO also must be made more attractive.

Romania approved a "National Security Strategy" and a "Military-Defense Doctrine" in 1994. Since 1998 these documents have been rewritten, but not yet approved. The RAF need an approved national strategy from which to derive defense strategy, military doctrine, and strategic directives. Nevertheless, with the assistance of the United Kingdom and United States (Kievenaar Study), a "National Defense Framework Action Plan" (FAP) for 2000-2005 and a "Long Term Framework" to 2010 have been established with the objective of joining NATO by 2005 and the EU by 2010. The plan identified three military options varying from 87,000, to 112,000, to 140,000

military personnel. According to the army reform, by 2004 the overall defense establishment will decline to 140,000 (112,000 military personnel and 28.000 civilians). This variant was a political decision taken because of Romania's financial limitations.

Phase one of the FAP (2000-2003) is to restructure the forces to achieve minimal operational capability; that is to provide credible defense and NATO interoperability. Phase two (2004-2007) expects to witness equipment modernization and achievement of operational capability. Romania's conscript cohort of 135,000 is more than adequate to meet its 12-month requirements, which were 67,000 in 1998 and will be reduced to 25,000 after 2000.

The officer corps pyramid is malformed and needs to be streamlined. Hence, before 2003 the current 30,000-strong Romanian officer corps must be halved. For example, its 2,300 colonels must be reduced to 630; the 5,618 lieutenant colonels to 1,800; the 7,800 majors to 2,200; and the 9,908 captains to 4,050. At the same time lieutenants should be increased from 3,051 to 3,750, and second lieutenants from 2,218 to 2,400. Also generals will increase from the current 101 to 120. Restructuring this unbalanced officer corps will be a difficult and painful process.

For the next few years, Romanian Human Resources Management Policy is to increase the number of NCOs in order to achieve a 3 to 1 ratio between NCOs and officers. The training of NCOs will continue to be a top priority. In order to build a professional NCO corps, focus has been placed on their training and the involvement of personnel trained in collaboration with the US Marine Corps. The American training pattern, in accordance with the NATO standards and training methods, has been generalized in all the NCO military training institutions. Up to 2002, during the 2nd MAP Cycle, almost 2,800 NCOs have been trained in different Romanian training facilities using NATO standards and methods. A new concept will be developed for the use of NCOs within the military establishment as platoon leaders as well as in administrative and staff positions. Junior officers will also receive training in the effective employment of the NCOs.

All discharged military personnel have been recipients of the Romanian re-conversion process and many have received employment counseling, training and

⁶⁵ Human Resources Management Directorate: <http://www.mapn.ro/engleza/index.htm>

assistance in finding new jobs. NATO analysts were concerned about the impact such a big number of soldiers being released will have on the labor market and Romanian society. Consequently, a re-conversion program was developed by Romania in cooperation with NATO specialized structures and it is sponsored by the World Bank. The re-education and resettlement programs for redundant military personnel have had the following results as of September 1, 2002:

- 1,687 personnel had received employment counseling;
- 850 personnel had applied for training courses to convert to a civilian career and should commence training shortly;
- 172 personnel were receiving training;
- 146 personnel had found employment;
- 143 personnel had received advice on starting new businesses; and
- 64 personnel had been helped in successfully starting new business ventures.⁶⁶

The armed forces restructuring process will continue till the meeting of the objectives included into the “Force Project 2005”, which consists of 70,000 soldiers and 15,000 civilians.⁶⁷

It is hard to find a specific NATO requirement about the size of military personnel, but the initial discussions with Romanian representatives in NATO roundtable suggested that the number were too big. A very important document is Kievenaar Study which was agreed by NATO organisms and became a standard in Romania-NATO negotiations. The guidance in documents like this has been taken into account in Romanian defense planning decisions.

⁶⁶ Romanian Ministry of National Defense: <http://www.mapn.ro/engleza/index.htm>

⁶⁷ Ibid

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V. CONCLUSIONS

To answer questions concerning NATO influence on the Romanian national security policy in the Post Cold War Era, this thesis examined Romania's arguments for joining the Alliance, the building blocks and mechanisms by which NATO extended its institutional and normative influence, and how these contributed to reducing chances for military conflict and political tension in the region and to reform of the Romanian Armed Forces.

With the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe following the Warsaw Pact dissolution in 1991, there was a need to establish a new security architecture in and for Europe and reconsider the existing military institutions because the West sought to promote security and stability in Europe and to expand the democratic system and values. NATO, by surviving these exciting times, turned out to be the security and defense framework for Europe. NATO had to change and adapt its internal civil and military structures, and reshape its posture of forces and echelons for combat and peace support operations. The Alliance also redefined its attitude towards other states, accepted three new members, and is looking for a "big bang" enlargement solution during the Prague summit.

Facing new political and economic instabilities and security risks, Romania, like other Central and Eastern European countries, started to seek guarantees and insurance for its security. These guarantees can be received only in an alliance with a system of collective defense that has proved its validity. This alliance proved to be NATO.

Romania experienced a violent revolutionary change as part of the democratic changes that took place in Europe. The victory of the 1989 Revolution opened the path to democratic reforms. The new internal political environment changed by putting into place political pluralism and the market economy.

The post-communist evolution of the country went through different dynamics, but the foreign policy was and still is focused on the same strategic objective: NATO integration. For achieving this important objective, Romania started the process of implementing NATO's requirements. Through an evolutionary process, both NATO and Romania have adapted their institutions, structures and norms for a better cooperation

and full interoperability. In view of the future NATO membership a great number of changes have been made in numerous fields, from external relations to legislation and serious downsizing of the armed forces.

The relations between Romania and Hungary, which have been plagued by a painful legacy of distrust and acrimony, have developed, influenced by the NATO mechanisms, into a strategic partnership.

All the activities that have been taken in the area of budgeting and downsizing the military personnel were consistent with the Romanian interest in becoming a NATO member (1996-1997). When the discussions about NATO enlargement included Romania as a possible candidate, the efforts were intensified to increase the speed of reform, while the processes were slowed when NATO membership was not on the horizon (1998-2000).

NATO's magnetism has exerted a great deal of positive influence on institutions and decision-making processes on defense related aspects.

In the twelve years of democratization Romania managed to put behind for good the legacy of the communist past, to establish working institutions, and to reintegrate into the community of free and democratic nations. It made its civilizational choice to belong to the world of stability and prosperity. Romania was realistic and consistent, within the framework of PfP, in its efforts to establish peace, security, confidence, and cooperation in the area.

Even though the trend looks like Romania following most of the NATO recommendations, there is an evident increase of speed and willingness in the decision process for reform associated with the NATO enlargement. All the domestic factors pay more attention to NATO's requirements when Romania has some chance to gain membership.

Romania's integration into NATO could be an asset for European stability and security, since the democratic security is a long-term investment for the stability of continent and beyond.

The building up of a secure and stable Europe can be achieved only with the involvement of all states that belong to this area of culture and civilization. Romania is part of this process and can further contribute to its success.

The new security risks need a common approach and a united endeavor of the states that have the necessary capabilities and political will to approach them. Romania cannot afford to waste another decade without a Western anchor, as Europe will not be “whole and free” without the integration of Romania within the Euro-Atlantic community. Romania has the capability and the availability to promote the NATO interests and values in the adjacent areas.

Romania’s integration into NATO will create an opportunity to better promote effective patterns of cooperation, with neighboring countries, as a credible model for the all countries in transition from South-East-Europe.

Taking into account its regional importance, due to the geographic location, territory, size of population, political and military potential, Romania will enhance –at a political and military level – the Alliance’s capability to prevent and to manage crisis in the region.

The South-Eastern Europe is passing through a difficult process from the security perspective. Acute social inequalities and imbalances, less than adequate overall democratic developments, ethnic and religious conflicts, illegal traffic with arms, people and narcotics, unresolved historical bilateral or multilateral tensions, and environmental pollution are only some of the major problems with which this area is confronted at the beginning of the 21st century. The fall of the Iron Curtain revealed all these aspects in a freer world, but the solutions have seemed harder to find and implement. In this respect, Romania has the chance to be a catalyst for bilateral relations of the countries from the region, facilitating, at the same time, the identification of lasting solutions for the tensions that may occur. The regional policy promoted by Romania can further facilitate the establishment of a framework for reconciliation and cooperation compatible with the European spirit.

Also, besides all the mechanisms describe in the analysis, through which NATO put the pressure on internal institutions, there are other aspects that can contribute to the process of developing a modern Romanian National Security. One of them is the direct contact of Romanian political and military actors with other countries and systems. How much influence can people trained abroad bring to the Romanian security system? This is a question for further research.

In recent debates about NATO enlargement, subjects like corruption, privatization, and the use of former Securitate members in intelligence agencies and the possibility that they might come in contact with NATO classified documents have been discussed. How much can NATO expand its influence in areas that are not obviously connected with NATO prime objectives?

And finally, NATO has tremendously increased its partnership with Russia and there is likelihood that seven new members will be accepted increasing the number of NATO countries to 26. What kind of organization will NATO become and what new mechanisms will be developed to keep the newly admitted states on the right track?

Keeping NATO's incentives "alive" and keeping Romania engaged in NATO's programs and structures has had a serious impact in promoting reforms and democratic changes. By wrapping NATO's umbrella around any country willing to join the Alliance it can encourage it to pursue reform.

NATO is not a static organization and the process of becoming compatible is a dynamic and complex one. To make it successful it needs a strong and long-term commitment from the political forces, and the people involved in dealing with every day requirements and standards should have good international skills.

All NATO's documents and programs provide a framework for discussions and they are very broad. The people who worked to make them possible do the difference in the way the standards are implemented. No matter where they are, in Bucharest, Brussels, or any Euro-Atlantic capital they need to be professional, competent, and tolerant, because finally they make the most important difference between the paper and real life issues. NATO's chief strength is not in its military forces but in the unified spirit of a free Euro-Atlantic people.

NATO has been - and still is - a catalyst for peace, stability, freedom and prosperity. Romania can consider itself lucky for being part of NATO's attention. The early PfP objectives and later MAP challenges have put pressure on the whole spectrum of Romanian society, from ordinary citizens to political leaders. The bar for NATO membership has been permanently raised. Closer scrutiny is placed on applicants, detailed evaluation, and tighter controls are employed to be sure that the states are following the Alliance's recommendations. However, there is an important flow of aid,

assistance, and guidance, much of it from the US. Without such control and help, Romanian society would be very different than it is today.

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